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Abstract
Analogical reasoning is an active topic of investigation across education, artificial intelligence (AI), cognitive psychology, and
related fields. In all fields of inquiry, explicit analogy problems provide useful tools for investigating the mechanisms underlying
analogical reasoning. Such sets have been developed by researchers working in the fields of educational testing, AI, and cognitive
psychology. However, these analogy tests have not been systematically made accessible across all the relevant fields. The present
paper aims to remedy this situation by presenting a working inventory of verbal analogy problem sets, intended to capture and
organize sets from diverse sources.
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Introduction
Analogical reasoning is the ability to grasp and exploit simi-
larities based on relations between sets of entities, rather than
solely on features of the individual entities themselves
(Holyoak, 2012). The general ability to think in terms of ex-
plicit relations is highly developed in humans, and indeedmay
constitute a discontinuity between human intelligence and
non-human intelligence (Penn, Holyoak, & Povinelli, 2008).
This cognitive process supports human performance in a wide
range of activities (Holyoak & Thagard, 1995), including
classroom learning (Richland, Zur, & Holyoak, 2007; Jee
et al., 2010), engineering design (Chan & Schunn, 2015),
and scientific reasoning (Dunbar, 1995; Gentner & Jeziorski,
1993). Performance on analogy tests is highly correlated with
measures of fluid intelligence (Snow, Kyllonen, &Marshalek,
1984). Analogy problems also provide an important source of
benchmarks for assessing the performance of models of rela-
tional processing developed by researchers in artificial intelli-
gence (AI) (e.g., Mikolov, Chen, Corrado, & Dean, 2013;
Turney, 2013).
Sets of explicit analogy problems provide useful tools for
investigating the mechanisms underlying analogical reason-
ing. Such sets have been developed by researchers working
in the fields of educational testing, AI, and cognitive psychol-
ogy. However, these analogy tests have not been systematical-
ly made accessible across all the relevant fields. The present
paper aims to remedy this situation by presenting a working
inventory of verbal analogy problem sets, intended to capture
and organize sets from diverse sources.
Analogy tests can be constructed in pictorial formats (e.g.,
Krawczyk et al., 2008); but here we focus on verbal problem
sets, which themselves are extremely varied in form and content.
First, analogies are frequently used in education as a method of
training and testing verbal aptitude in children at various grade
levels. Standardized tests (e.g., School and College Ability Test,
or SCAT; Secondary School Admission Test, or SSAT; and the
Scholastic Aptitude Test, or SAT), as well as other educational
materials (e.g., englishforeveryone.org) provide useful sources of
analogy problem sets tailored to specific stages of cognitive de-
velopment (e.g., Turney, Littman, Bigham, & Shnayder, 2003).
Second, recent advances in AI have been facilitated by a number
of analogy problem sets used as benchmarks for computational
models (e.g., Mikolov et al., 2013a; Mikolov, Sutskever, Chen,
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Corrado, & Dean 2013; Mikolov, Yih, & Zweig 2013;
Gladkova, Drozd, & Matsuoka, 2016; Turney, 2008). Third, re-
search in cognitive psychology has produced an extensive liter-
ature on analogical reasoning in humans. Researchers in this area
have produced several analogy problem sets for which data on
human performance is available (e.g., Morrison et al., 2004;
Green, Kraemer, Fugelsang, Gray, & Dunbar, 2010, 2012;
Kmiecik, Brisson, & Morrison, 2019). The general aim of the
present inventory is to provide a centralized source of analogy
problem sets drawn from multiple domains so as to facilitate
further research on analogical reasoning in both humans and
machines.
Analogies can be expressed in a variety of forms, and a
given form can be varied to produce different types of analogy
problems (see Table 1). Consider the familiar four-term
A:B::C:D verbal analogy form, in which the meanings of
two words, A and B, are related to each other in the same or
a similar way as two other words, C and D (e.g., dog:puppy ::
kitten:cat). Analogy problems in this form involve a minimal
mapping process: Solving an A:B::C:D analogy involves
grasping a single source relation (A:B term) and reasoning
about a single target relation (C:D term).
Within this form, several types of analogy problems can
be created. In one type, which we will call evaluative prob-
lems, an intact four-term sequence of words is presented
(as in the above example), and the reasoner is asked to
judge whether or not the sequence forms a valid analogy
(e.g., Kmiecik et al., 2019).
Table 1. Form-based taxonomy of analogy problems included in the present inventory
Analogical
form
Question/Task type Example question/Task description Correct response
A:B::C:D Evaluative (e.g., Green et al., 2010) answer:riddle :: jersey:number invalid
One-term Generative (e.g., Green et al., 2012) ash:fireplace :: lint:? pocket
Two-term Generative (e.g., Popov et al., 2017) book:writer :: ?:? blueprint:architect
Multiple-Choice (e.g., Sternberg & Nigro, 1980) yes:no :: true:?
A. false
B. right
A. false
Matrix (e.g., Weinberger et al., 2016) helmet:head
mitt:baseball
amnesia:memory
boat:anchor
inventor:invention
eraser:pencil
spray:skunk
mother:daughter
antenna:signal
kneepad:knee
porkchop:pig
etc.
mitt:baseball
kneepad:knee
Story / long
text
Retrieval (e.g., Wharton et al., 1994) Having read some target story
and some cue stories
N/A
Generative (e.g., Gentner & Toupin, 1986) Having read some story, recreate
that story using new characters
N/A
Problem Solving (e.g., Gick & Holyoak, 1980) Use analogous story to solve radiation
problem (Duncker, 1945).
Radiation problem: How can you use
radiation rays to destroy a patient’s
tumor while avoiding destroying their
healthy tissue?
Send a series of small radiation
rays into the body that all
converge at the tumor.
Extended Mapping (e.g., Turney, 2008) bacterial mutation:slot machine ::…
1. bacteria:?
2. genes:?
3. mutating:?
4. reproducing:?
5. dying:?
options:
losing
reels
slot machines
spinning
winning
1. slot machines
2. reels
3. spinning
4. winning
5. losing
Behav Res
In a second type, which we will call generative problems,
the reasoner is presented with incomplete analogies and is
asked to complete the analogy by generating the missing
terms, without being given a set of options from which to
choose. This second problem type can be subdivided into
two distinct subtypes: one-term generative problems (e.g.,
Green et al., 2012) and two-term generative problems (e.g.,
Popov, Hristova, & Anders, 2017). In the former, the incom-
plete analogy omits the D term only (e.g., dog:puppy ::
kitten:?), and the reasoner is simply tasked with generating
the D term. In the latter, the incomplete analogy omits both
the C and D terms (e.g., dog:puppy :: ?:?), and the reasoner is
tasked with searching through semantic memory for a com-
plete exemplar of the relation instantiated by A:B.
In a third type, which we will call multiple-choice prob-
lems, the reasoner is presented with incomplete analogies,
where either the D term is omitted or where both the C and
D terms are omitted, just as with generative problems.
However, the reasoner is also presented with a small number
(e.g., four) of options to complete the analogy and is asked to
select the best term(s) from that set of options (e.g., dog:puppy
:: kitten:?; a. child, b. tiger, c. cat, d. toy; Turney et al., 2003).
While we distinguish between one-term and two-term gener-
ative problems above, we do not draw a parallel distinction
between one-term and two-term multiple-choice problems.
Regardless of whether only the D term or both the C and D
terms are omitted, solving multiple-choice problems simply
involves selecting the missing terms from a small, highly
constrained set of options.
Finally, in a fourth type, which we will call matrix problems,
reasoners are provided with an A:Bword pair (e.g., helmet:head)
along with an large number (e.g., 20) of word pair options (e.g.,
mi t t : ba s eba l l , amnes i a :memory, boa t :ancho r ,
inventor:invention, eraser:pencil, spray:skunk,mother:daughter,
antenna:signal, kneepad:knee), and are asked to select any op-
tions that independently form a valid analogy with the A:Bword
pair (Weinberger, Iyer, &Green, 2016; plausible responses in the
parenthetical example above are bolded). Given the large number
of word-pair options provided for each A:B word pair, matrix
problems involve a larger search space for valid analogies than
do the multiple-choice problems described above (typically with
four options). However, the search space for matrix problems is
still constrained to a predefined set of options, in contrast to the
unconstrained search space that characterizes generative
problems.
Verbal analogies can also be created that do not conform to
the simple A:B::C:D format. Instead, an elaborated source
analog (usually relatively familiar or concrete) can be related
to a target analog (usually less familiar or more abstract).
Solving analogy problems in this broader form, which we
term extended mapping analogies, involves finding multiple
relational correspondences between the two analog domains.
This complex mapping process contrasts with the compara-
tively simple mapping process involved in solving A:B::C:D
problems as described above. The source and target may take
the form of rich narratives expressing different but analogous
plots, ideas, or characters (e.g., Gentner & Toupin, 1986;
Wharton, Holyoak, Downing, Lange, Wickens, & Melz.,
1994) or expressing problems to be solved (e.g., Gick &
Holyoak, 1980). The source and target may also be presented
in a more skeletal form as two sets of constituent concepts
(e.g., Turney, 2008).
In addition to variations in form, analogies can vary in the
nature of their content (see Table 2). A wide range of abstract
semantic relations based on word meaning can be used to gen-
erate four-term verbal analogies (Bejar, Chaffin, & Embretson,
1991). For example, the two word pairs in the analogy up:down
:: rise:fall instantiate the relation opposite, whereas those in the
analogy joke:laughter :: injury:pain instantiate the relation
cause:effect. Syntactic or morphological relations based on word
form can also be used to generate four-term verbal analogies
(e.g., Mikolov et al., 2013c). For example, the two word pairs
in the analogy high:higher :: sad:sadder instantiate the morpho-
logical relation adjective:comparative, and those in the analogy
make:makes :: support:supports instantiate the relation infinitive
verb: present verb.
More broadly, another content distinction is between near
or within-domain analogies and far or cross-domain analogies
Table 2. Content-based taxonomy of analogy problems included in the present inventory
Content distinction Instance A:B::C:D example
Relation type (especially relevant to
AI problem sets)
Syntactic high:higher :: sad:sadder (common relation:
adjective:comparative)
Semantic up:down :: rise:fall (common relation: opposite)
Semantic distance (especially relevant
to Cognitive Psychology problem sets)
Near / within-domain blindness:sight :: deafness:hearing (shared domain:
human senses)
Far / cross-domain blindness:sight :: poverty: money (A:B domain: human senses;
C:D domain: social resources)
Word familiarity (especially relevant to
Education problem sets)
Familiar happy:sad :: fat:skinny
Unfamiliar jubilant:melancholy :: corpulent:gaunt
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(e.g., Green et al., 2010; Holyoak &Koh, 1987). For example,
blindness:sight :: deafness:hearing is a relatively near analo-
gy, whereas blindness:sight :: poverty: money is semantically
more distant. Solving far analogies is generally more difficult
for human reasoners than is solving near analogies. Moreover,
generating solutions for far but not near analogies facilitates,
and is indeed a manifestation, of creative thinking in humans.
Specifically, this process increases a tendency to think in terms
of the relations between entities rather than in terms of their
attributes (Vendetti,Wu, &Holyoak, 2014). This distinction is
not exclusive to A:B::C:D analogy problems. Semantic dis-
tance has also been manipulated in longer narratives, and
studies show that retrieving a semantically distant narrative
to solve an analogous target problem is more difficult than
retrieving a semantically close narrative (Keane, 1987).
Finally, the content of an analogy can vary with respect to the
general familiarity of the individual words out of which it is
constructed. For example, happy:sad :: fat:skinny is composed
of relatively familiar words, whereas jubilant:melancholy ::
corpulent:gaunt is composed of less familiar words. The diffi-
culty of an analogy problem can be easily manipulated by using
more or less familiar words (the latter yielding more difficult
problems). Notably, this difficulty does not arise directly from
increased complexity of the analogical mapping process. Rather,
decreasing word familiarity decreases the likelihood that a hu-
man reasoner will fully grasp the individual word meanings, a
precondition for successful analogical mapping. This variation in
content highlights the importance of semantic knowledge in rea-
soning about analogies.
Aside from content, another important dimension of variation
among analogy problem sets is their sheer size. For investigating
insight, or spontaneous use of analogy to solve problems, even a
single problem may suffice (e.g., Gick & Holyoak, 1980). For
other purposes, such as neuroimaging studies, a set of roughly
100 well-controlled problems may be necessary (e.g., Green
et al., 2010). For the purpose of evaluating AI models, it may
be useful to have available a set of several thousand analogy
problems (e.g., Gladkova et al., 2016).
We will now provide an overview of analogy problem sets
that have been developed in education, AI, and cognitive psy-
chology. This overview is not intended to be exhaustive, but
rather to give a general guide to the types of datasets made
available in the present inventory.
Problem Sets from Education
Verbal analogies are a popular way to train and test children’s
verbal aptitude. A number of educational materials (e.g.,
EnglishForEveryone.org) and standardized tests (e.g., the
SCAT) provide useful sources of large verbal analogy problem
sets. These materials are designed for children at different grade
levels, and they include problem sets that can serve as
benchmarks of analogical reasoning across development. For
example, the SCAT test includes three versions representing three
levels of difficulty. The first version is administered to children in
2nd and 3rd grade, the second version to children in 4th and 5th
grade, and the third version to children in 6th and 7th grade.
Combined with other standardized tests (e.g., SSAT, and older
versions of the SAT) as well as other educational material, anal-
ogy problems drawn from education sources represent levels of
difficulty appropriate for kindergarten through 12th grade.
The current inventory includes problem sets compiled from
testing and test preparation materials for the SSAT (Kotchian &
Simmons, 2012; Enrollment Management Association, 2017a &
b; Varsity Tutors, 2007-2019a & b), SCAT (Center for Talented
Youth Johns Hopkins University, 2013a, b, & c), and the SAT
(Turney et al., 2003), as well as additional educational materials
from MindWare (2007) and EnglishForEveryone.org (n.d.; see
Table 3). These sets consist solely of multiple-choice problems
with either one or two terms missing from A:B::C:D verbal
analogies. Since these problems conform to a single type, varia-
tions in difficulty across grade levels are primarily attributable to
the content of the analogies. As previously mentioned, content
can vary according to the relation underlying an analogy (e.g.,
synonym versus antonym), the semantic distance between ana-
logs (e.g., mad:angry :: down:sad versus quick:fast), and the
familiarity of the words that comprise an analogy (e.g.,mad:angry
:: down:sad versus livid:irate :: despairing::melancholy). Relation
and word familiarity are important dimensions for analogy diffi-
culty; analogies designed for older students tend to feature more
specific semantic relations and less familiar words. For example,
compare an analogy from theSATwritten for high school students,
lull:trust :: cajole:compliance, with an item from the Elementary
Level SSAT written for students in third grade, listen:music ::
read:book.
While these problem sets are not accompanied by explicit
human performance data, typical human performance can be
inferred from mean scores on the tests. For example, Turney
et al. (2003) compiled a set of 374 analogies from unofficial
SAT preparation web sites, the Educational Testing Service
(ETS) website (http://www.ets.org/), a book of actual SAT
questions (Claman, 2000), and from other SAT guidebooks.
Turney and Littman (2005) estimated human performance on
this problem set using accuracy of the average test taker
(college-bound high school seniors) on the SAT Verbal sec-
tion. This approach assumes that analogy problems on the
SAT Verbal subtest are as difficult as the rest of the SAT
Verbal section, and that the analogy problems in this collection
are as difficult as the analogy problems on the official SAT.
Overall, while all of these analogy problems are multiple-
choice problems in the A:B::C:D format, the sets provide a wide
range of diversity in problem difficulty, and are helpfully orga-
nized across multiple levels of difficulty corresponding to differ-
ent grade levels as well as different stages of cognitive
development.
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Problem Sets from Artificial Intelligence
Verbal analogies have garnered a considerable amount of interest
in AI research, most notably in the area of natural language
processing (NLP). Developing NLP applications that can under-
stand natural language requires a kind of dictionary that repre-
sents word meanings in some way.Word embeddings are a type
of lexicon in which word meanings are represented as real-
valued vectors in n-dimensional space (typically 300 dimensions,
each with a continuous value). These gained popularity after
Mikolov et al. (2013a) demonstrated that word embeddings pro-
duced by theirWord2vecmodel using a recursive neural network
could solve some verbal analogies. As a consequence, the
Google analogy test on which Mikolov et al. (2013a) demon-
strated this success became a popular benchmark that has since
been used to test several other algorithms for producing word
embeddings (e.g., Baroni, Dinu, & Kruszewski., 2014; Faruqui,
Tsevskov, Yogatama, Dyer, & Smith., 2015; Schnabel, Labutov,
Mimno, & Joachims, 2015; Zhai, Tan, & Choi., 2016). In gen-
eral, verbal analogies have become a popular tool for evaluating
the overall quality of word embeddings (Gladkova & Drozd,
2016; Gladkova et al., 2016).
The current inventory includes four problem sets that have
been used to test NLP word embeddings: the Google analogy
test (Mikolov et al., 2013a), the Google phrase analogy test
(Mikolov et al., 2013b), the Microsoft Research test (MSR;
Mikolov et al., 2013c), and the Bigger Analogy Test Set
(BATS; Gladkova et al., 2016; see Table 4). Separately, the
current inventory includes an additional dataset, the Turney
set (Turney, 2008), which was developed outside of recent
attempts to evaluate word embeddings, and features extended
mapping problems. Because the Turney set differs in format
from the four NLP sets, we will first describe the latter as a
group, followed by a separate description of the former.
NLP Analogy Sets
All the NLP sets are very similar in general structure,
consisting exclusively of evaluative problems within the
A:B::C:D format. The analogy items are explicitly categorized
according to their relations. For example, the MSR contains
8000 analogy problems organized into eight categories
representing different relations. Across these four problem
sets, the MSR includes syntactic relations only, the Google
Table 3. Summary of analogy problem sets taken from education materials
Problem set Source Grade #
problems
*Analogy Challenges Mindware. (2007). Analogy Challenges (Beginner Level). K-2 124
SCAT Elementary Level Center for Talented Youth Johns Hopkins University (2013a).
School and college ability tests: Sample questions for 2nd and 3rd graders.
2–3 10
SCAT Middle Level Center for Talented Youth Johns Hopkins University (2013b).
School and college ability tests: Sample questions for 4th and 5th graders.
4–5 10
SCAT Upper Level Center for Talented Youth Johns Hopkins University (2013c).
School and college ability tests: Sample questions for 6th graders and all higher grades.
6–8 10
SSAT Official Guide Elementary
Level – Grade 3
Enrollment Management Association (2017a). The Official Study
Guide for the Elementary Level Grade 3.
3 7
SSAT Official Guide Elementary
Level – Grade 4
Enrollment Management Association (2017b). The Official Study
Guide for the Elementary Level Grade 4.
4 7
*SSAT for Dummies
Middle Level
Kotchian, V. & Simmons, C. (2012) SSAT and ISEE For Dummies. 5–7 30
*SSAT for Dummies Upper
Level
Kotchian, V. & Simmons, C. (2012) SSAT and ISEE For Dummies. 8–11 30
SSAT Varsity Tutors
Elementary Level
Varsity Tutors. (2007–2019a). SSAT elementary level verbal: Analogies.
https://www.varsitytutors.com/ssat_elementary_level_verbal-help/analogies.
3–4 109
SSAT Varsity Tutors
Middle Level
Varsity Tutors. (2007–2019b). SSAT middle level verbal: Analogies. https://www.varsitytutors.
com/ssat_middle_level_verbal-help/analogies.
5–7 100
SAT Turney, P. D., Littman, M.L., Bigham, J., & Shnayder, V. (2003). Combining independent
modules to solve multiple-choice synonym and analogy problems. In Proceedings of the
International Conference on Recent Advances in Natural Language Processing (RANLP-03),
pp. 482–489.
9–12 374
English for Everyone EnglishForEveryone.org. Analogies Worksheets. https://www.englishforeveryone.
org/Topics/Analogies.htm.
1–12 24–30
NB: All problem sets provide multiple choice A:B::C:D analogy problems. They are not organized according to relation
*These problem sets are not publicly available; however, their sources are available for purchase at the following links:
Mindware (2007): http://bloomingminds.com/analogy-challenges-beginner-level.html
Kotchian & Simmons (2012): https://www.dummies.com/store/product/SSAT-and-ISEE-For-Dummies.productCd-1118115554.html
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phrase analogy problems include semantic relations only, and
the Google analogy problems and the BATS feature a mix of
syntactic and semantic relations. The analogies in these sets
were all constructed by collecting a set of word or phrase pairs
that instantiate a given relation, and then combining all word
or phrase pairs from a given relation set to create four-term
analogies (each consisting of two word or phrase pairs), using
all possible permutations. For example, the analogies instan-
tiating the relation adjective:adverb in the Google analogy test
were constructed by combining 32 word pairs each instantiat-
i n g t h a t r e l a t i o n ( e . g . , ama z i n g : ama z i n g l y ,
apparent:apparently) into all possible permutations, yielding
a set of 992 (32 × 31) analogy problems for that relation.
The Google sets and MSR are more similar to each
other than either is to BATS. First, the former tests in-
clude different numbers of analogies instantiating various
relations. Overall, the number of word pairs per relation
varies between 20 and 70 for the former two problem sets.
BATS, on the other hand, standardizes the number of
word pairs per relation at 50. Second, the Google sets
and MSR exclusively consist of near analogies based on
word pairs that involve both relational and more direct
semantic similarity. BATS, on the other hand, includes
both near and far analogies.
Turney
The Turney problem set, derived from psychological and lin-
guistic studies, was created to evaluate a computational model
of analogical reasoning, the Latent Relation Mapping Engine
(LRME; Turney, 2008). This set includes 20 extended map-
ping problems. Ten problems involve scientific analogies tak-
en from Holyoak and Thagard (1995), and the remaining ten
problems feature common metaphors taken from Lakoff and
Johnson (1980). Each analogy consists of a source domain
and a structurally similar target domain between which a hu-
man reasoner can map a rich set of relational correspondences.
The extended mapping problems in the Turney set reduce
each of these analogical domains to two sets of 5–9 key terms.
For example, in one problem, solar system is the source and
atom is the target. This analogy includes seven key terms:
solar system, sun, planet, mass, attracts, revolves, and gravity
constitute the solar system set; whereas atom, nucleus,
electron, charge, attracts, revolves, and electromagnetism
constitute the atom set.
Turney (2008) had 22 participants complete these extended
mapping problems. For each problem they were presented
with the list of terms from the source and were asked to use
the items from the target to “construct an analogical mapping;
that is, a one-to-one mapping” between the two sets. The data
reported are the percentage of participants whose responses
matched the intended mapping for each problem.
Problem Sets from Cognitive Psychology
The current inventory (see Table 5) includes fifteen problem
sets created for basic research in cognitive psychology:Green-
Table 4. Summary of analogy problem sets taken from the AI literature
Problem set Source Relations
(#)
Problems
(#)
Relation types
Google analogy test Mikolov, T., Chen, K, Corrado, G., & Dean, J. (2013a).
Efficient estimation of word representations in vector space.
In Proceedings of International Conference on Learning
Representations (ICLR).
14 19,544 Semantic &
syntactic
Google phrase analogy test Mikolov, T., Sutskever, I., Chen, K., Corrado, G. S.,
& Dean, J. (2013b). Distributed representations of words
and phrases and their compositionality. Advances in neural
information processing systems, 26, 3111–3119.
5 3218 Semantic
Microsoft Research (MSR) Mikolov, T., Yih, W., & Zweig, G. (2013c). Linguistic Regularities
in Continuous Space Word Representations. In HLT-NAACL, pp.
746–751.
8 8000 Syntactic
Bigger Analogy Test Set
(BATS)
Gladkova, A., Drozd, A., & Matsuoka, S. (2016). Analogy-based
detection of morphological and semantic relations with word
embeddings: what works and what doesn’t. In Proceedings of the
NAACL-HLT SRW, pp. 47–54, San Diego, California.
40 *99,200 Semantic &
syntactic
Turney Turney, P.D. (2008), A uniform approach to analogies, synonyms,
antonyms, and associations, In Proceedings of the 22nd International
Conference on Computational Linguistics (Coling 2008), pp. 905–912,
Manchester, UK.
140 20 Semantic
NB: All problem sets, except for Turney, consist of evaluative A:B::C:D analogy problems. Turney consists of extended mapping story / long text
analogy problems
*BATS consists of word pairs that can be combined to produce A:B::C:D evaluative analogy problems
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eval (Green et al., 2010), Kmiecik (Kmiecik et al., 2019),
Green-gen (Green et al., 2012), Popov (Popov et al., 2017),
Jurgens (Jurgens, Mohammad, Turney, & Holyoak, 2012),
Sternberg (Sternberg & Nigro, 1980; Morrison et al., 2004),
the UCLA Verbal Analogy Test (VAT; Lu, Wu, & Holyoak,
2019b), Weinberger (Weinberger et al., 2016), Wharton
(Wharton et al., 1994), Clement (Clement & Gentner, 1991),
Rattermann (Gentner, Rattermann, & Forbus, 1993), Gentner
(Gentner & Toupin, 1986), Gick (Gick & Holyoak, 1980),
Gick 2 (Gick & Holyoak, 1983), and Keane (Keane, 1987).
Overall, these problems sets are highly diverse. Some include
analogies in the A:B::C:D format, consisting of either
evaluative (e.g., Green et al., 2010), one-term generative
(e.g., Green et al., 2012), two-term generative (e.g., Popov
et al., 2017), or multiple-choice problems (e.g., Sternberg,
1980). Others involve more elaborate sources and targets
expressed as analogous plots, characters, or ideas to be used
in retrieval (e.g., Wharton et al., 1994), generation (e.g.,
Gentner, & Toupin, 1986), and problem-solving tasks (e.g.,
Gick & Holyoak, 1980). Because several of these problem
sets were developed as experimental stimuli, many are asso-
ciated with data on human performance. These data mainly
take the form of reaction times, accuracy rates, and explicit
judgments of difficulty. Because these analogy sets are so
numerous, we describe a subset and the procedures for gath-
ering corresponding data. Each problem set described below is
meant to exemplify a different formal type of analogy problem
(see Table 1).
A:B::C:D Evaluative Problems (Green-eval)
The Green-eval problem set was created to examine the
neural bases of analogical reasoning (Green et al., 2010,
2012). This set contains 120 A:B::C:D evaluative prob-
lems. The set is organized into 40 triplets of analogy prob-
lems sharing a common A:B term, while varying the C:D
term. Each triplet forms either a valid within-domain anal-
ogy, a valid cross-domain analogy, or an invalid analogy.
In half of the triplets, the invalid analogy is constructed out
of within-domain word pairs; in the other half, the invalid
analogy is constructed out of cross-domain word pairs.
Both the within-cross domain classification and the valid-
invalid classification were established at a level of > 90%
agreement among 84 human raters. Raters responded to the
following prompt to make the within-cross domain classi-
fication: “Are the items in the left word pair taken from the
same semantic domain as the item in the right word pair?
That is, do the two-word pairs involve similar kinds of
things or different kinds of things?”
Separately, the semantic distance between word pairs in
all 120 analogy problems was estimated using latent se-
mantic analysis (LSA; Landauer & Dumais, 1997;
Landauer, Foltz, & Laham, 1998). The LSA application
(http://lsa.colorado.edu) calculates the similarity between
the contextual-usage meanings of words as measured by
the cosine of the included angle between vectors assigned
to those words within a very high-dimensional semantic
space derived from a large corpus of English text. Vectors
for word pairs were obtained by adding together the vec-
tors for the individual words within word pairs, and the
semantic distance between word pairs was calculated by
pairwise comparisons between the A:B word pair and the
C:D word pairs used to form each problem in the analogy
triplet (i.e., the within- and cross-domain analogous word
pairs and the non-analogous foil). The mean semantic dis-
tance between word pairs was .55 for within-domain anal-
ogies and .91 for cross-domain analogies.
Green et al. (2010) had 84 native English-speaking un-
dergraduates evaluate all 120 analogies, using a seven-
point scale to respond to the following prompt: “How dif-
ficult is it to identify the analogical connection?” In addi-
tion, 23 participants performed an experimental task in
which they were sequentially presented with each four-
word analogy from the 120-analogy set, and asked to indi-
cate whether the presented word pairs constituted a true
analogy (i.e., analogous word pairs) or a false analogy
(i.e., non-analogous word pairs). The human data accom-
panying the Green-eval problem set consists of the accura-
cy rates and reaction times from this task.
A:B::C:D One-Term Generative Problems (Green-gen)
While the Green analogy set contains evaluative analogy
problems, it and any set of valid A:B::C:D analogies can be
easily converted to generative analogy problems by dropping
the D term from each problem. This was done by Green et al.
(2012), resulting in the Green-gen set. Vendetti et al. (2014)
also used the Green-gen set. In the latter study, a group of 54
English-speaking UCLA undergraduates generated solutions
to the 80 valid analogies from the Green-gen set (40 within-
domain and 40 cross-domain). Vendetti et al. (2014) showed
that generating solutions to the cross-domain problems in-
duced a relational mindset in participants (i.e., increased par-
ticipants’ propensity to think in terms of relations between
entities rather than constitutive features of those entities).
The human data accompanying this problem set consists of
the accuracy rates from this task reported by Vendetti et al.
(2014).
A:B::C:D Two-Term Generative Problems (Popov)
The Popov dataset (Popov et al., 2017) was created for use in a
task that aimed to induce relational luring based on the unin-
tentional and long-term priming of semantic relations. The set
has also been used as a training set for a computational model
of relation learning (Lu, Liu, Ichien, Yuille, & Holyoak,
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2019a; Lu, Wu, & Holyoak, 2019b). It contains 8–31 word
pairs (e.g., car:driver, jacket:cold, beer:mug) instantiating
each of 58 specific relations (e.g., vehicle-driven-by, pro-
tects-against, container-of), which were in turn categorized
under one of ten relation types. Each word pair constitutes a
separate two-term generative analogy problem, in which a
reasoner might be presented with a word pair as an incomplete
A:B::C:D analogy (e.g., winter:summer :: ?:?) and asked to
generate an analogous word pair (e.g.,war:peace). Word pairs
grouped under the same specific relation offer a pool of valid
responses to each analogy problem. In addition to providing a
set of two-term generative analogy problems, word pairs in
Table 5. Summary of analogy problem sets taken from the cognitive psychology literature
Problem
set
Source Relations Problems
(#)
Analogical
form
Question
type
Green-eval Green, A. E., Kraemer, D. J. M., Fugelsang, J., Gray, J. R., & Dunbar, K. (2010).
Connecting Long Distance: Semantic Distance in Analogical Reasoning Modulates
Frontopolar Cortex Activity. Cerebral Cortex, 10, 70–76
Indefinite 80 A:B::C:D Evaluative
Kmiecik Kmiecik, M. J., Brisson, R. J., & Morrison, R. G. (2019). The time course of semantic
and relational processing during verbal analogical reasoning. Brain and Cognition,
129, 25–34
5 720 A:B::C:D Evaluative
Green–gen Green, A. E., Kraemer, D. J.M., Fugelsang, J., Gray, J. R., &Dunbar, K. (2012). Neural
correlates of creativity in analogical reasoning. Journal of Experimental Psychology:
Learning, Memory, & Cognition, 38(2), 264–272
Indefinite 80 A:B::C:D One-term
genera-
tive
Popov Popov, V., Hristova, P., & Anders, R. (2017). The relational luring effect: Retrieval of
relational information during associative recognition. Journal of Experimental
Psychology: General, 146(5), 722–745
58 950 A:B::C:D Two-term
genera-
tive
Jurgens Jurgens, D. A., Mohammad S. M., Turney P. D., & Holyoak K. J. (2012)
SemEval-2012 Task 2: Measuring degrees of relational similarity. In Proceedings of
the First Joint Conference on Lexical and Computational Semantics (*SEM), pp.
356–364
79 3218 A:B::C:D Two-term
genera-
tive
Sternberg Sternberg, R. J. & Nigro, G. (1980). Developmental patterns in the solution of verbal
analogies. Child Development, 51, 27–38.;
Morrison, R.G., Krawczyk, D., Holyoak, K.J., Hummel, J.E., Chow, T., Miller, B., &
Knowlton, B.J. (2004). A neurocomputational model of analogical reasoning and its
breakdown in frontotemporal lobar degeneration. Journal of Cognitive
Neuroscience, 16, 260–271
5 197 A:B::C:D Multiple
choice
VAT Lu, H., Wu, Y. N., &Holyoak, K. (2019). Emergence of analogy from relation learning.
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, USA. 116(10). 4176–4181
4 80 A:B::C:D Multiple
choice
Weinberger Weinberger, A., Iyer, H., & Green, A. E. (2016). Conscious augmentation of creative
state enhances “real” creativity in open-ended analogical reasoning. PLoS ONE 11,
e0150773
Indefinite 10 A:B::C:D Matrix
Wharton Wharton, C. M., Holyoak, K. J., Downing, P. E., Lange, T. E., Wickens, T. D., &Melz,
E. R. (1994). Below the surface: Analogical similarity and retrieval competition in
reminding. Cognitive Psychology, 26, 64–101
Indefinite 14 Story / long
text
Retrieval
Clement Clement, C., & Gentner, D. (1991). Systematicity as a selection constraint in analogical
mapping. Cognitive Science, 15, 89–132
Indefinite 4 Story / long
text
Retrieval
Rattermann Gentner, D., Rattermann, M. J., & Forbus, K. D. (1993). The roles of similarity in
transfer: Separating retrieval from inferential soundness. Cognitive Psychology, 25,
524–575
Indefinite 18 Story / long
text
Retrieval
Gentner** Gentner, D, & Toupin, C. (1986). Systematicity and surface similarity in the
development of analogy. Cognitive Science, 10, 277–300
Indefinite 54 Story / long
text
Generative
Gick* Gick, M. L. & Holyoak, K. J. (1980). Analogical problem solving. Cognitive
Psychology, 12, 306–355
Indefinite 1 Story / long
text
Problem
solving
Gick2* Gick, M. L. & Holyoak, K. J. (1983). Schema induction and analogical transfer.
Cognitive Psychology, 15, 1–38
Indefinite 2 Story / long
text
Problem
solving
Keane Keane, M. (1987). On retrieving analogues when solving problems. The Quarterly
Journal of Experimental Psychology, 39(1), 29–41
Indefinite 1 Story / long
text
Problem
solving
*Additional variations of ray problem analogs presented here can be found in:
Catrambone and Holyoak (1989)
Holyoak and Koh (1987)
**This dataset includes nine sets of characters, but only one of these character sets is accompanied by a story set
NB: All problem sets involve semantic relations
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this dataset may also be combined to create a set of evaluative
analogy problems as in the NLP datasets (e.g., Mikolov et al.,
2013a).
This dataset was constructed with Bulgarian words and
using Bulgarian-speaking participants. Seventy-nine partici-
pants were presented with two-word pairs and were asked to
generate three-word pairs exemplifying the same relation in
descending order of the degree to which each word pair ex-
emplified that relation. For example, a participant might be
presented with Bulgarian translations of pipe:water and
artery:blood, and then generate Bulgarian translations of
cable:current , drain:rain , system:medicine , where
cable:current is considered to best exemplify the same rela-
tion as pipe:water and artery:blood (something like flows-
through), followed by drain:rain and then system:machine.
The Popov dataset provides indirect estimates of relation typ-
icality, based on the frequency with which participants gener-
ated a particular word pair for each relation, weighted accord-
ing to the number of times that that word pair was generated
first (weighted most heavily), second, or third (weighted least
heavily).
Subsequently, a native Bulgarian speaker and fluent
English speaker translated all word pairs into English. The
dataset was cleaned, excluding word pairs no longer bearing
any relation similarity to seeds when word pairs were trans-
lated into English, and combining word pairs that were distin-
guishable in Bulgarian but that had the same English
translation.
A:B::C:D Multiple Choice Problems (Sternberg)
The Sternberg problem set was created to examine the devel-
opment of analogical reasoning performance and strategy
from mid-childhood to adulthood (Sternberg & Nigro,
1980). It contains 180 multiple-choice A:B::C:D analogy
problems for which reasoners are asked to select the correct
D term from two options. These problems are distributed
evenly across five different relation categories: synonymy,
antonymy, category membership, linear ordering, and
functional.
Morrison et al. (2004) used a subset of the Sternberg anal-
ogy problems to examine the role of semantic inhibition in
analogical reasoning. They collected human judgments of the
semantic association between C:D (correct) word pairs and
between C:D’ (incorrect) word pairs. One-hundred fifty un-
dergraduates were presented one pair at a time (e.g.,
give:party) and were asked to use a five-point scale to rate
“how associated” the words in each pair were. From these
judgments, a semantic facilitation index (SFI) was calculated
for each analogy problem by subtracting the z-score of the
semantic association rating of the C:D’ word pair from that
of the C:D word pair. The SFI value represents how much the
semantic association between the C:D word pair relative to
that of between C:D’ word pair favors choosing the correct
response for an analogy problem (e.g., a positive SFI implies
the terms in the correct analogical option are more highly
associated than are those in the foil). An additional group of
54 undergraduates were asked to solve these analogies, and
their accuracy and correct response reaction times, along with
SFI values, were used to select 24 analogy problems for use in
a study examining analogical reasoning in frontotemporal lo-
bar degeneration (FTLD).
A:B::C:D Matrix Problems (Weinberger)
The Weinberger problem set was created to examine how
explicit instruction to think creatively influences analogical
reasoning (Weinberger et al., 2016). Specifically, the
Weinberger problem set was developed as a measure of
open-ended analogical reasoning. It contains two matrices,
each featuring five unique A:B stem pairs (e.g., helmet:head)
and 20 unique completion pairs. For each stem pair, reasoners
are instructed to select completion pairs to make as many valid
analogies as they can, selecting only completion pairs for
which they can describe how they are analogous to the A:B
stem pair. Reasoners are allowed to select the same comple-
tion pair for multiple stem pairs in a given matrix. This option
ensures that reasoners do not eliminate completion pairs from
consideration for reasons other than failing to find a valid
analogy with the relevant stem pair. Importantly, this problem
set involves open-ended problems for which there is not nec-
essarily an optimal response.
The construction of word pair matrices was informed by
expert opinion, empirical testing, and computational model-
ing. Stem and completion pairs were drawn from stimuli used
in previous studies that obtained high rates of accuracy, and
the validity of analogies between stem and completion pairs
was further assessed by domain experts. The two matrices of
five stem pairs and 20 completion pairs were matched for the
creativity of possible solutions. Specifically, they were
matched on the mean semantic distance between stem pairs
and completion pairs as measured using LSA (Landauer &
Dumais, 1997; Landauer et al., 1998), described under the
Green-eval problem set.
The resulting set of stem and completion pairs have a num-
ber of features that makes this problem set particularly useful
for studying creativity as manifested in analogical reasoning.
For example, correct completion pairs represent at least three
levels of semantic distance (e.g., kneepad:knee – near;
mitt:baseball – middling; atmosphere:earth – far) from the
corresponding stem pair (e.g., helmet:head). This feature en-
ables making a distinction between correct responses that are
uncreative or boring from those that are creative or interesting.
Further, the presence of several completion pairs that do not
form a valid analogy with a given stem pair creates a distinc-
tion between responses that reflect meaningful creativity (i.e.,
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correct responses that are semantically distant from the corre-
sponding stem pair) and those reflecting meaningless and un-
constrained divergence (i.e., incorrect responses, especially
those that are semantically distant from the corresponding
stem pair).
Story / Long-Text Retrieval Tasks (Wharton)
The Wharton problem set was created to examine the role of
analogical similarity in accessing episodes in human memory
(Wharton et al., 1994), and to evaluate a computational model
of analogical retrieval, Analog Retrieval by Constraint
Satisfaction (ARCS; Thagard, Holyoak, Nelson, &
Gochfeld, 1990). It includes 14 sets of four stories, three of
which were derived from materials in Seifert, McKoon,
Abelson, and Ratcliff (1986) and five of which were derived
frommaterials in the Rattermann set of 18 story sets (Gentner,
Rattermann, & Forbus, 1993), which is also included in the
inventory. Each set of four stories features the same basic
events (e.g., receiving a call about a job, going shopping for
items related to a job), and includes two stories each involving
one of two unique story plots that were created by rearranging
the sequence of propositions expressing these events. These
unique story plots each correspond to a story theme (e.g.,
counting your chickens before they’re hatched, versus finding
desperately needed employment) dependent on more abstract
causal relations. Pairs of stories sharing the same theme con-
stitute analogous stories, and pairs of stories with different
themes constitute disanalogous stories. These four-story sets
are divided into two subsets, each containing one
disanalogous story pair (see Table 6). Across all 14 story sets,
two supersets were produced by compiling one disanalogous
pair from each story set into one superset and compiling the
other disanalogous pairs into the other superset. After reading
the stories, 28 undergraduates responded to a questionnaire in
which they used a six-point scale to indicate “how similar are
the scenes being described”. Analogous story pairs were rated
as more similar than disanalogous story pairs, and
disanalogous story pairs were rated as more similar than story
pairs in different sets.
Wharton et al. (1994) gave UCLA undergraduates 1 min to
read each story from one superset (target stories) and to rate
each on a six-point scale for imagability (i.e., how easy the
story was able to visualize mentally) in order to ensure seman-
tic processing. Next, participants completed a 5-min logical
reasoning experiment as a distractor task. Finally, participants
were given an open amount of time to read each story from the
other superset (cue stories), and write down what they were
reminded from the target stories while reading each cue story.
The human data associated with the Wharton problem set
consist of participants’ responses to this final task. Data re-
ported are overall probabilities of being reminded of the target
by the cue in each condition.
Story / Long-Text Generative Tasks (Gentner)
The Gentner problem set was created to examine the develop-
ment of systematicity (i.e., sensitivity to parallels based on
more complex relations) in analogical reasoning (Gentner &
Toupin, 1986). The set comprises nine source stories, each of
which can be adapted into either of two versions: systematic
or non-systematic. Each source story follows a standard struc-
ture, within which slight adaptations determine whether the
version is systematic or non-systematic. The standard struc-
ture includes three sections: an introductory section that intro-
duces the characters, an event sequence describing some out-
come, and a moral. Systematic versions include introductory
sections that describe the protagonist in terms of some habit or
relational trait (e.g., “There was once a very jealous cat”),
whereas non-systematic versions feature introductory sections
that describe the protagonist in terms of some relationally
neutral trait (e.g., “There was once a very strong cat”). In
addition, non-systematic versions do not include a moral sec-
tion (see Table 7).
Each story version contains three character roles that can be
filled in various ways to create stories to fit one of three different
mapping conditions. In addition to the three character roles, each
source story has three test characters (e.g., seal, penguin, and
dog), which participants are asked to use in their main task of
generating a target story analogous to the source story. Test
Table 6. Example of a story set used in Wharton problem set (adapted
from Seifert et al., 1986). This example is from Wharton et al. (1994).
Theme 1 can be expressed roughly as counting your chickens before they
hatch, while Theme 2 can be expressed roughly as finding desperately
needed employment
Set A:
Theme 1: Ernie was really encouraged about his interview for a security
guard at the new factory in town. He thought he was saved. Ernie went
to the shopping mall and hunted around for a dark blue security guard
uniform, and bought several. The next day he received a phone call
from the factory personnel director about the security guard position.
Ernie was dismayed that he had wasted money. He didn't have a job.
Theme 2: Carl wasn't working at the time. He was very concerned
because he had very little left in his bank account. Several days later he
had lunch with the president about becoming a broker. Carl thought he
had impressed people when he gave his resume to the investment firm.
Carl went to the department store and tried on some suits, and got a
few. He felt that he was moving up again.
Set B:
Theme 1: Ronnie thought she had it made because she thought she had
done well in the audition for a keyboard player. Ronnie went to the
music store, played some electric organs, and then purchased one.
Later she got a message from the guitar player about playing
keyboards. She wasn't in a band. Ronnie was depressed that she had
run up her credit card.
Theme 2: Cindy was upset she that she had blown her savings. She wasn't
employed. Cindy was really happy about her tryout as dancer for a new
musical. That night she met the director about the dancer position.
Cindy got over to some stores, searched for, and bought some leotards.
She believed her troubles were over.
Behav Res
characters vary in their direct similarity, and their similarity to
characters in the source story determine eachmapping condition.
In the high-transparency condition, source story roles are filled
by characters that are physically similar to test characters filling
the same role (e.g., seal – walrus, penguin – seagull, dog – cat).
In a medium-transparency condition, source story roles are filled
by characters that are not physically similar to any of the test
characters (e.g., seal – lion, penguin – giraffe, dog – camel). In
the low-transparency condition, source story roles are filled by
characters that are physically similar to test characters filling
different roles (e.g., seal – cat, penguin – walrus, dog – seagull).
This low-transparency condition creates what is referred to as a
“cross-mapping”, such that mappings based on shared attributes
(e.g., physical similarities between characters; seal – walrus,
penguin – seagull, and dog – cat) differ from those based on
shared relations (e.g., role-based similarities between char-
acters shown in the low-transparency example above). This
dissociation between attribute and relational similarity is
more commonly manipulated in sets of visual analogy
problems (e.g., Tohill & Holyoak, 2000), but its presence
here is worth mentioning as it offers a useful way to exam-
ine the respective contributions of attribute and relation
similarity in guiding inference. Since each source story
can produce either a systematic or a non-systematic version,
given three mapping conditions, each basic source story can
produce six different specific source stories. In total, the
Gentner set can produce 54 story problems.
Each analogy problem requires that the participant repro-
duce each story’s plot using three designated test characters.
After reading a given story, reasoners infer the roles of the test
characters by reading that story’s introduction with the story
characters replaced by test characters. The particular roles that
test characters fill in these introductions are determined by the
mapping condition. For example, in the high-transparency
condition, given the introduction, “There was once a very
jealous cat who was friends with a walrus. The cat often said
to the walrus, ‘Don’t ever play with anyone else but me.’”, the
test phase would begin with the following: “There was
once a very jealous dog who was friends with a seal. The
dog often said to the seal, ‘Don’t ever play with anyone else
but me.’”.
Gentner and Toupin (1986) tested child participants, a
younger group (4–6 years old) and an older group (8–10 years
old). Participants were asked to reproduce the stories using
toys representing each character. Performance was assessed
using six propositions representing major events and the out-
come for each story. Systematic stories had a seventh propo-
sition expressing the story’s moral. A proposition was scored
as correct if a participant expressed it either verbally or non-
verbally with the correct characters. A proposition was scored
as incorrect if a participant either omitted it from their repro-
duction or expressed it incorrectly by using the wrong char-
acters. The group data are reported as mean accuracy rates for
each age group and for the six story types.
Story / Long-Text Problem-Solving Tasks (Gick)
The Gick problem set was created to examine the role of
analogy in problem solving. It centers around the radiation
problem from Duncker (1945) in which reasoners are asked
to solve the following problem:
Suppose you are a doctor faced with a patient who has a
malignant tumor in his stomach. It is impossible to op-
erate on the patient, but unless the tumor is destroyed,
the patient will die. There is a kind of ray that can be
used to destroy the tumor. If the rays reach the tumor all
at once at a sufficiently high intensity, the tumor will be
destroyed. Unfortunately, at this intensity, the healthy
tissue that the rays pass through on the way to the tumor
will also be destroyed. At lower intensities, the rays are
harmless to healthy tissue, but they will not affect the
tumor either. What type of procedure might be used to
destroy the tumor with the rays, and at the same time
avoid destroying the healthy tissue?
In order to evaluate how analogy aids human reasoners in
problem solving, the dataset includes a series of stories that
vary in the degree that they present (1) analogous situations
and (2) analogous solutions to the radiation problem. Here is
an example of a story that presents both an analogous situation
and an analogous solution to the radiation problem:
A small country fell under the iron rule of a dictator. The
dictator ruled the country from a strong fortress. The
Table 7. Sample story in systematic and non-systematic versions (sys-
tematic version includes indented material) from Gentner problem set.
From Gentner and Toupin (1986)
Setting a: There was once a very jealous cat who was friends with a
walrus. The cat often said to the walrus, “Don’t ever play with anyone
else but me.”
One day the cat went away on a trip and the walrus had no one to play
with. But then a seagull came to visit the walrus. He brought a wagon
along and said, “Would you like to play with me and my wagon?” The
walrus said, “Yes.” The seagulls and the walrus had a great time pulling
each other around in the seagull’s wagon.
When the cat came back and found the walrus playing with someone
else he got very angry. He shouted, “I’ll never play with you again!”
The cat was so angry that he jumped into the seagull’s wagon. But the
wagon began to roll faster down a steep hill. The car was very scared.
The seagull jumped up and chased after the wagon so that cat wouldn’t
crash. The seagull stopped the runaway wagon and saved the cat’s life.
Moral b: In the end, the cat realized that being jealous only got him into
trouble. It is better to have two friends instead of one.
a Setting, non-systematic version: There was once a very strong cat who
was friends with a walrus
bMoral is omitted in non-systematic version
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fortress was situated in the middle of the country,
surrounded by farms and villages. Many roads radiated
outward from the fortress like spokes on a wheel. A
great general arose who raised a large army at the border
and vowed to capture the fortress and free the country of
the dictator. The general knew that if his entire army
could attack the fortress at once it could be captured.
His troops were poised at the head of one of the roads
leading to the fortress, ready to attack. However, a spy
brought the general a disturbing report. The ruthless
dictator had planted mines on each of the roads. The
mines were set so that small bodies of men could pass
over them safely, since the dictator needed to be able to
move troops and workers to and from the fortress.
However, any large force would detonate the mines.
Not only would this blow up the road and render it
impassable, but the dictator would then destroy many
villages in retaliation. A full-scale direct attack on the
fortress therefore appeared impossible.
The general, however, was undaunted. He divided his
army up into small groups and dispatched each group to
the head of a different road. When all was ready he gave
the signal, and each group charged down a different
road. All of the small groups passed safely over the
mines, and the army then attacked the fortress in full
strength. In this way, the general was able to capture
the fortress and overthrow the dictator.
This set contains eight stories in total. Three of these stories
are three similar versions of the above story that vary slightly
in wording but that all present both analogous situations and
solutions to the radiation problem. Two other stories use the
same first paragraph of the above story and so present
analogous situations to the radiation problem, but they present
different, disanalogous solutions. One other story presents a
disanalogous situation but an analogous solution to the
radiation problem. A final pair of stories presents
both disanalogous situations and solutions to the radiation
problem.
Gick and Holyoak (1980) presented undergraduates with
different combinations and subsets of these stories across sev-
eral experiments. One experiment generated data on the rates
at which participants proposed one of three different solutions
to the radiation problem after having read one of three analo-
gous stories, each featuring a different solution. Another ex-
periment generated data on the completeness of participants’
generated solutions to the radiation problem after either hav-
ing read one of two stories or no story at all. A third experi-
ment generated data on the rates at which participants were
able to provide solutions to the radiation problem without
having read any story, after having read at least one story,
and after having read at least one story and receiving a hint
to use it.
Conclusion
Verbal analogy tests are extremely varied in form and content,
and we have offered a rough taxonomy to capture and system-
atize some of this variability (see Tables 1 and 2). Here, we
provide a database consolidating analogy problem sets across
education, AI research, and cognitive psychology research.
Education offers a useful source of test sets with A:B::C:D
multiple-choice problems tailored to specific age groups. AI
research has provided large test sets with A:B::C:D evaluative
problems. Finally, cognitive psychology research has generat-
ed highly varied test sets often accompanied by human per-
formance data.
As a procedural note, we urge readers and users to cite
original papers when using analogy sets accessed from the
present inventory, and to respect copyright claims when repro-
ducing test items. Our aim here is to provide a centralized
source of analogy problem sets so as to facilitate future re-
search on analogical reasoning in both humans and machines.
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